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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Pentico (Pentico) brings this appeal to challenge the District Court's 
affirmation of the Magistrate Court's Order Summarily Dismissing his Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief (hereinafter the "Petition"). That Petition pertains to his conviction in State v. 
Pentico, Ada County Case #CR-MD-2008-0005321, which was appealed to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and ultimately decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals, State v. Pentico, Docket No. 37834, 
2011 Opinion No. 60. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. On January 4, 2013, Pentico filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. R. 5-17. 
2. On March 26, 2013, the Ada County Prosecutor's Office filed a Motion for Summary 
Dismissal, R. 22-23, a Brief in support of that Motion, R. 24-32, and an Answer, R. 33-
38. 
3. The Magistrate filed a Notice ofintent to Grant Summary Dismissal, R. 39. 
4. Pentico responded by filing a Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition 
which included: 
a) A supporting memorandum, R. 41- 51; 
b) A supporting Affidavit of Heidi Tolman which included excerpts from the 
Appellant's Brief that Pentico filed with the Supreme Court in State v. Pentico, 
R. 52-78; 
c) A supporting Affidavit of Allen R Derr (Pentico's Trial Counsel in State v. 
Pentico), R.79- 82; and, 
d) A supporting Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline (as an expert witness who had 
extensive knowledge of the case), R.83- 89. 
5. Pentico also sought and obtained an Order taking judicial notice of the file maintained by 
the Ada County Clerk in State v. Pentico, R. 90-97. 
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6. On June 11, 2013, the Magistrate entered an Order Granting Summary Dismissal, R. 98~ 
99. 
7. On July 5, 2013, Pentico appealed the Order summarily dismissing his action to the 
District Court, R. 101-102 and shortly thereafter on July 8, 2013, filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal, R. 103-104. 
8. Briefs were filed by the parties. Petitioner's Brief, R. l 09-121, Respondent's Brief, R. 
122-131 and Petitioner's Reply, R.132- 148. 
9. After a hearing, the District Court Judge Michael McLaughlin, entered, on February 16, 
2014, a Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the Order Granting Summary 
Dismissal, R.153-167. 
10. On March 10, 2014, Pentico filed a Petition for Rehearing, R. 168-169, and in accordance 
with I.A.R. 42(b) filed a Memorandum in Support of that Petition on March 24, 2014, R. 
171- 177. 
11. On April 29, 2014, the Respondent filed a Response to the Petition for Rehearing, R.179-
183. 
12. After a hearing, the District Court entered on May 20, 2104, a Memorandum Decision on 
Motion for Reconsideration in which the Court denied the motion for reconsideration of 
its earlier decision, R.186-188. 
13. Pentico filed a Notice of Appeal on June 20, 2014, seeking review by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. R.189-191. 
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Statement of the Facts 
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was cited for trespass in violation of LC. § 18-7011. The 
charge arose from the fact that he had just been to third floor of the Borah Building to drop off a 
letter at the temporary office of the Governor. After two motions to dismiss and two 
amendments to the complaint, Pentico was ultimately charged with trespass in violation of LC. § 
18-7008(A)(8). It was only possible to convict Pentico on this charge because of an incident 
which occurred on March 25, 2008. On that day he was confronted by a law enforcement 
officer, charged with providing security at the temporary quarters of the Idaho Legislature (the 
Capital Annex), and told that he was no longer authorized to be on the grounds of the Capital 
Annex or to be on the third and fourth floor of the Borah Building (hereinafter the "Ask to 
Leave")1 
Because of the inaction of trial counsel (failure to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Ask to Leave), which was not based upon any strategy determination, and trial counsel's further 
action (filing a I.R.E. Rule 404(b) Motion in Limine), which was not taken with contemplation 
of its impact upon establishing the factual basis for a constitutional challenge to the Ask to 
Leave, Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel did not insure that the record in State v. Pentico included 
evidence relative to the nature of Mr. Pentico's conduct at the time of the Ask to Leave.2 This 
defect in the record of the criminal trial has been addressed by the presentation of unrebutted 
evidence in the record of this proceeding which demonstrates that at the time of the 
confrontation, Mr. Pentico was doing nothing more than entering the Capital Annex grounds 
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,909,265 P.3d 519,523 (2011). 
2 Affidavit of Alan R. Derr, 11 4, 5, 6, R. 79-81 and State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 909, 265 
P.3d 519, 523 (2011). 
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from the adjacent street on his way to speak to Representative Lenore Barrett to request her 
assistance in securing an Attorney General's opinion. 3 
Allen Derr (hereinafter Derr), who represented Pentico in the trespass proceedings, 
challenged the charges which were, as the case progressed, premised in sequence upon three 
different statutes. Criminality under the first two were charges, I.C. § 18-7011 and LC. § 18-
7008, turned solely upon events of April 2, 2008. The third charge, premised upon LC. § 18-
7008(A)(8), was hinged upon the April 2, 2008 visit to the Governor's office but pursuant to the 
clear language of LC. 18-7008(A)(8), that visit could only be treated as a criminal trespass if 
within a year prior to that visit, Pentico had been asked to leave property to which I.C. 18-
7008(A)(8) applied.4 
In the course of def ending Pentico, Derr failed to assert several important and viable 
constitutional defenses. These defenses have been identified in the Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief (hereinafter the "Petition"), appropriately supported by affidavits, and never 
addressed by any Court. 
First, the Petition asserts that the Ask to Leave was itself unconstitutional and thus could 
not trigger a lawful one year exclusion - the predicate fact for a claim that the visit to the 
Governor's office was a trespass. 5 The defense was not was not raised by Mr. Pentico's trial 
lawyer. 6 While an attempt was made to have this defense considered on appeal,7 the Court of 
3 Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico, 1, 2 - 7, Exhibit A to Petitioner's Response to State's 
Motion For Summary Disposition, filed May 20, 2013. R. 48-49 (hereinafter "Aff. Pentico.") 
4 See, Idaho Code § 18-7008(A)(8). 
5 First Cause of Action, Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, p. 3-5. R.3-5. 
6 State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,913,265 P.3d 519,526 (2011). 
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Appeals declined to consider the defense because the factual basis was not evident in the trial 
record and because the Court of Appeals could not, based upon the appellate record, rule out the 
possibility that Trial Counsel's failure to develop that record was not a matter of tactics 
connected to the filing of the Motion in Limine. 8 
This deficiency in the record has been cured by unrebutted evidence submitted in this 
action. Derr admits that he did not consider and assert the claim that the Ask to Leave was not 
constitutional and therefore that it could not be the predicate event for a one year exclusion under 
I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8). He attributes this omission, not to a conscious decision of any sort, but 
rather to an omission arising from the fact that he had become focused by the prior charges 
solely on the events of April 2.9 In addition, he admits that he filed a I.R.E. 404(b) Motion In 
Limine without giving any consideration to the impact that such a motion might have on his own 
ability to present evidence demonstrating that Pentico's conduct on March 25, 2008, was 
constitutionally protected and could not provide a lawful basis for an Ask to Leave sufficient to 
trigger a one year exclusion pursuant to I.C. 18-7008(A)(8). 10 
Through unrebutted expert testimony, Pentico has demonstrated in the record of this 
action that, with respect to this constitutional challenge (the statute could not be applied to 
Pentico's conduct on March 25 so there was not a valid Ask to Leave), Derr provided ineffective 
representation. He failed without any strategic basis for doing so, to make any attempt to 
7 See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Heidi Tolman (Copy of excerpts from Pentico's Brief on Appeal 
to the Idaho Supreme Court) R. 55-78 (hereinafter "Appellate Brief). 
8 State v. Pentico, supra., pp. 913-914, 526-527. 
9 Affidavit of Allen R. Derr, ~ 4, Exhibit C to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion For 
Summary Disposition, filed May 20, 2013. R. 78-79 (hereinafter "Aff. Derr") 
10 Aff. Derr~ 6, R. 80-81. 
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provide the Court with the evidence it would have needed to determine that the Ask to Leave, 
which occurred on March 25, 2008, was unconstitutional. He compounded this failure by 
asserting arguments premised upon an unfounded "understanding" that State had evidence that 
Pentico was engaged in harassing behavior at the time of the Ask to Leave (which was both 
contrary to the what Pentico had told him and to the trial testimony of the officer who made the 
Ask to Leave). He further compounded the adverse impact of these actions by filing an I.R.E. 
404(b) Motion in Limine without contemplating the possibility that he needed to do so in a 
manner which made it clear to the Trial Court that the Motion pertained to any crimes, wrongs or 
bad actions which occurred before the Ask to Leave (itself the essential predicate to the 
prosecution and thus probably always in play regardless of the filing of the Motion in Limine). 11 
Second, the Petition asserts that any application of I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) which precludes 
re-entry for one year to a traditional public forum like the Capital or a designated public forum 
like the reception area of the Governor's Office, violates due process protections afforded by the 
Idaho and the United States Constitutions. Specifically, he has contended that the statute is over 
broad as applied to such public property both: 
1. To the extent it imposes an automatic and complete one year exclusion from the 
use of such properties without regard to the justification for the Ask to Leave or 
the excluded person's intended future use of that property; and, 
2. To the extent that it fails to afford any cognizable form of procedural due process 
relative to either Ask to Leave or the one year exclusion. 12 
11 Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, ,r,r 8-9, Exhibit D to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion 
For Summary Disposition, filed May 20, 2013. R. 86-88 (hereinafter "Aff. Bistline.") 
12 Second Cause of Action, Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, R.5- 6. 
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The record is devoid of any evidence that these due process challenges were raised by 
Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel. 13 Mr. Pentico attempted to have these Defenses considered by the 
Court of Appeals. 14 The Court of Appeal's decision does not even acknowledge that these 
arguments were raised. 15 Mr. Pentico has demonstrated in the record of this action, that his Trial 
Counsel, Mr. Derr, never considered these procedural due process challenges to the application 
of the statute to Mr. Pentico. 16 Through unrebutted expert testimony, Mr. Pentico has 
demonstrated in the record of this action that in failing to assert these procedural due process 
challenges in the course of defending Mr. Pentico on the charge of trespass pursuant to I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8), Mr. Derr provided ineffective representation of Mr. Pentico. 17 
13 See, Idaho v. Pentico, supra., 151 Idaho at 909 - 910,265 P.3d at 522 - 523. 
14 See Appellate Brief pp. 28-31, R.71 - 74. 
15 See, Idaho v. Pentico, supra. 
16 Aff. Derr i15 R. 80. 
17 Aff. Bistline i1 9, R. 
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ISSUES 
I. Did the District Court err when it upheld the Trial Court's grant of summary 
dismissal? 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court erred When It Upheld The Trial Court's Grant Of Summary Dismissal. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Pentico seeks post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4901(1) on the 
basis that his conviction was in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State 
of Idaho. In particular he contends that: 
( 1) He could not constitutionally be convicted of a violation of I. C. § 18-7008(8) based on 
his conduct on April 2, 2008. That conduct was sanctionable only if he entered the Governor's 
office less than one year after a legally sufficient Ask to Leave. In this case, the predicate Ask 
to Leave was unconstitutional because the unrebutted evidence demonstrates that on March 25, 
2008, when he was asked to leave the Capital Annex grounds (a traditional public forum) he was 
doing nothing more than entering the property from an adjacent street with the intention to go 
and speak to a Legislator to seek her assistance in securing an Attorney General's opinion; 
(2) He could not constitutionally be convicted of a violation of I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) based on his 
conduct on April 2, 2008. Given the undisputed circumstances of this case, that conduct was 
sanctionable only to the extent that, after an Ask to Leave, the statute could constitutionally 
generate an automatic and conclusive one year exclusion. In this case, the unrebutted facts 
demonstrate this exclusion was both an impermissible prior restraint of protected conduct 
(indeed, it was applied to him to criminalize an otherwise totally lawful entry of a designated 
public forum) and an impermissible depravation of rights without any procedural due process; 
(3) He could not constitutionally be convicted of a violation of LC. § 18-7008(8) based on his 
conduct on April 2, 2008. Given the undisputed fact that important and substantial 
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constitutional defenses were not raised and that no adequate record was made at trial in order to 
preserve those defenses for appeal, he was denied constitutionally sufficient effective assistance 
of Trial Counsel. 
It is Mr. Pentico's position that there has never been a judicial determination premised 
upon the available evidence which addresses either of the substantive and procedural due process 
issues. Though both arguments should have been raised in the Trial Court by Mr. Derr, neither 
were. Though both arguments were raised by Appellate Counsel, no determination was made as 
to the merits of either issue. The Court of Appeals did not mention let alone determine the 
merits of the procedural due process arguments. The Court of Appeals did discuss the 
substantive due process issue but only to the point of concluding that given the available factual 
record the issue could not be raised on appeal and, as a consequence, the Court did not determine 
the issue on its merits. 
Under these circumstances it is appropriate to conclude that the record in this matter 
amply demonstrates that either Mr. Derr provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not raising 
the appropriate constitutional arguments and properly developing the factual records or that 
despite the efforts of Appellate Counsel to raise these arguments for resolution on the appeal of 
the criminal action, it was not possible, given the record, to do so. Either way, the unrebutted 
evidence in this record, raises substantial doubt about the constitutionality of the conviction of 
Mr. Pentico. 
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B. Standard of Review 
On appeal from a summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, this 
Court exercises free review of the record to determine if the trial court correctly found that there 
existed no genuine issues of material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Remington v. State 127 Idaho 443, 446, 901 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Ct. App. 1995). Further, 
this Court exercises de novo review over legal conclusions. Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715, 716, 
947 P.2d 388, 389 (1997); and, exercises free review over the district court's determination that 
constitutional requirements were satisfied considering all the facts of the case. Buffington v. 
State, 130 Idaho 507, 509, 943 P.2d 933, 935 (1997). 
The summary disposition process applicable to an application for post-conviction relief 
under LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 
56. State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 868, 934 P.2d 931, 934 (1997). The petitioner is entitled 
to have the facts construed in a light most favorable to the petitioner. If the facts, taken as true 
would entitle the petitioner to relief, summary disposition is not appropriate. Saykhamchone v. 
State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). A motion to dismiss, unsupported by 
affidavits, depositions or materials does not controvert the allegations in the petition. Cooper v. 
State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). A petition for post-conviction relief 
should only be summarily dismissed where the petitioner has not presented evidence establishing 
a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which he bears the burden of proof. 
Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998). 
Where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged, the lower Court's 
determination is reviewed de novo. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285, 
1287 (2000). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
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establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of 
validity. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). Appellate Courts are 
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. However, if a 
statute "as applied" to a particular defendant infringes upon his or her First Amendment right of 
freedom of speech, the defendant's conviction must be reversed without showing that such 
infringement was substantial. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004). 
Where the petition for post-conviction relief is based on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a motion for summary dismissal may not be granted where the petitioner establishes: 
(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a 
material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. 
Saykhamchone, supra, 127 Idaho at 323, 900 P.2d at 799. 
Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly stated that an applicant for post-conviction relief 
bears the burden of proving a constitutional violation and of demonstrating prejudice from that 
violation which would entitle him to relief. See, e.g. Free v. State, 125 Idaho 760, 765, 874 P.2d 
571, 576 (Ct. App.1993). Mr. Pentico has been unable to identify any Idaho appellate court 
decision which identifies a standard for determining if the burden of proof has been met. 
Referring to the language of I.C. 19-4901(1) it appears that for the purpose of summary 
disposition it should be sufficient for a petitioner to identify facts and law which demonstrate 
that a credible argument can be made that he was prosecuted for and convicted of violating a 
statute which could not constitutionally be enforced against him or his conduct. 
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1. Mr. Pentico Has Been Convicted In Violation Of The Substantive Due Process 
Protections Afforded To Him By The Constitution Of The United States And Of 
Idaho. 
The trespass statute as applied under the circumstances of this case is unconstitutionally 
overbroad therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. It is clear that, to this 
point, no Court has allowed this issue to be considered and determined on the basis that it was 
not raised in the Trial Court and no adequate factual record was available. See State v. Pentico, 
supra, 151 Idaho at 913,265 P.3d at 526. 
Any application of the Bill of Rights to limit State action falls within the rubric of 
substantive due process. Most rights included in the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the 
United States has long recognized that the right to petition government for a redress of grievance 
is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately connected both in origin and in 
purpose with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and press. United Mine Workers 
of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass 'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). Idaho has its own due 
process guarantee which similarly guarantees that a citizen may not be deprived of substantive 
rights without due process of law. See, e.g. 0 'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42-43, 
202 P.2d 401,404 (1949). 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. Idaho affords similar 
protections. Article I, Sections 9 & 10, Idaho Constitution. Although these rights are not 
absolute and do not guarantee unlimited access to government property for expressive purposes; 
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restrictions must not be content-based and the property designation must be taken into 
consideration in determining whether any restriction is permissible. 
The concept of overbreadth of criminal laws rests on principles of substantive due process which 
limits the obstruction of certain individual freedoms. The principal issue is whether the language 
of the statute, given its normal meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may apply to conduct 
protected by the Constitution. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840. 
The overbreadth doctrine is a means of challenging the constitutionality of a statute on its face or 
as applied to particular conduct. If the statute is being challenged "as applied" then the 
application of the statute is unconstitutional if it infringes upon constitutionally protected 
conduct and does not serve to protect a significant state interest. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 
893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004). 
The statute at issue states: 
LC. § 18-7008. Trespass-Acts constitution.-A. Every person who willfully 
commits any trespass, by either: 
(8) except under landlord-tenant relationship, who first being duly notified in 
writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real 
property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or 
who, without permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a 
year, after being so notified. 
The described crime can occur in two ways. The first part of the statute criminalizes a 
failure to leave property after a qualifying request (herein the "Ask to Leave"). To qualify as an 
Ask to Leave, the request must be made orally or in writing by the owner or his agent. The 
second part (herein the "one year exclusion" part) criminalizes returning to same property within 
a year after there has been a qualifying Ask to Leave. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged that, when applied to the public, the statute 
is not necessarily constitutional. In State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), the 
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defendant, having finished his business at the Department of Health and Welfare Office had 
begun to behave inappropriately. He was asked to leave public property and was arrested when 
he refused to do so. While the Court acknowledged the District Court's concern that the statute 
could be applied against someone who entered the Capitol on their way to meet with a legislator, 
the Court concluded that the statute was not, for this reason, facially overbroad because it did not 
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. In discussing this conclusion 
the Court stated: 
Assuming that a criminal trespass prosecution is filed pursuant to LC. § 18-7008 against a 
person on public property who is exercising his or her free speech rights, the statute could 
be attacked as applied to that constitutionally protected conduct 
Korsen, supra, 138 Idaho at 715-716, 69 P.3d at 135-136. 
The unrebutted and, therefore, for this proceeding, true facts presented to the Court with 
the precise circumstances which justify a determination that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied. It is true that Pentico was not arrested for refusing to leave on March 25, 2008, but there 
can be no question that the Ask to Leave, if enforceable, impaired his right to return to the 
Capitol and perhaps to the other identified properties. This restriction impermissibly infringed 
upon free speech rights especially in view of the nature of the property to which a valid one year 
exclusion would have applied. Perry Educ. Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37, 
44 (1983). 
The Supreme Court established in Perry a forum-based approach to classify public 
property into three distinct categories: traditional, designated, and non-public forums. Id. at 45-
46. "Traditional public forum" include places such as "streets and parks which have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and time-out-of-mind, have been used 
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
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questions." Id. "Designated public forums" the government has opened with the intent that they 
be used by the public as a place to engage in expressive activity. Id. at 45. Examples include 
university meeting facilities, municipal theatres, and school board meeting rooms. When the 
category is either "traditional" or "designated" individual exercise of First Amendment rights can 
be restricted only when it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the restriction is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that end. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726, (1990). 
Courts have long recognized that the capitol grounds as a whole meet the definition of a 
traditional public forum: they are open to the public and intended to be used in a way that is 
consistent with public expression. Lederman v. United States of America, 291 F.3d 36, 41, (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the primary purpose for which 
the Capitol was designed is legislating" and that "the fundamental function of a legislature in a 
democratic society assumes accessibility to public opinion." Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of 
Capitol Police, 409 U.S. 972, (1972). Thus, the Capitol Annex, its interior offices and its 
grounds are presumptively a place where individuals are allowed and even encouraged to assert 
their First Amendment rights. 1 
The principles which cause space within the Capitol Annex to be traditional forum apply 
equally to the Governor's office. The Governor is the chief executive officer of the State, an 
elected public official. Historically in Idaho, the Governor's office is simply an extension of the 
Capitol. The Governor is active in the legislative process consequently whatever rules apply to 
the legislators and the capitol building should also apply to the Governor and his reception area. 
Therefore, with respect to the Capitol Annex and the Governor's reception area "the 
18 There is no doubt that there are private spaces within the Capitol Annex, however, there is no 
evidence that Pentico's conduct violated any restrictions separating public forum from private 
space. 
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government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: "It may enforce 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
To whittle away at a citizen's right to grieve government actions by restricting their 
access to buildings, especially where, as here the restriction is triggered by constitutionally 
protected conduct, needlessly chills free expression. Pentico was ordered off of a traditional 
public forum (the Capitol Annex grounds) while he was attempting to go to the office of a state 
legislator to seek her assistance and his conviction is premised on the conclusion that, based on 
this protected conduct, he was consequently banned, for a period of one year, from the entire 
Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floor of the Borah Building (including the Governor's 
reception area), and the State Board of Education office. All of these locations are traditionally 
open to the public so that the public can visit their elected representatives and administrative 
officials so that they can seek help or to request action when they believe they have a grievance. 
Here, the Ask to Leave on March 25, 2008, could clearly not have provided a valid basis 
for an arrest. If his conduct on that date could not provide a constitutionally adequate basis for 
an arrest, how could it provide a constitutionally adequate basis, an apparently absolute and 
conclusive one year exclusion, the violation of which would be ( even if involving otherwise 
totally valid and appropriate conduct in traditional public forums) the basis for a criminal 
prosecution? 
There are no cases on point regarding the second part of the statute yet from the structure 
of the statute, it is clear that there can be no valid one year exclusion if there is no qualifying 
Ask to Leave (e.g. the request was not made by the Owner or an authorized agent). It is upon the 
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occurrence of the necessary Ask to Leave, that the one year exclusion is triggered. Thus, it 
would appear that as to any property, before a trier of fact could consider whether a one year 
exclusion had been violated, it would be necessary for the trier of fact to determine that a 
qualifying Ask to Leave had occurred. Given all of the circumstances of this case and the 
gravity of the rights at issue, it is not possible to conclude either that a valid Ask to Leave 
occurred or that a valid one year exclusion was created. Thus, the conviction of Mr. Pentico for 
violating a non-existent one year exclusion is manifestly a violation of his constitutional rights. 
2. Mr. Pentico Has Been Convicted In Violation Of The Procedural Due Process 
Protections Afforded To Him By The Constitutions Of The United States And Of 
Idaho. 
As it has been applied to Mr. Pentico, I.C. § 18-7008 (A)(8) works as a violation of his 
rights to procedural due process in two material ways. First, the statute affords him with no 
meaningful process to respond to what must be, for the purpose of this proceeding, treated as a 
manifestly arbitrary Ask to Leave or to obtain any review of the reasonableness of the one year 
exclusion. Second, the statute, to the extent it can create an automatic and conclusive one year 
exclusion from a traditional public forum is an impermissible prior restraint on speech. In both 
respects, once Officer Pattis directed him to leave State property, Mr. Pentico was faced with two 
alternatives. He could accept a forfeiture of constitutionally protected liberty interests or he 
could risk criminal prosecution. Citizens should not be placed in this position. 
a. Eriforcement of the one year exclusion provision of IC §18-7008(A)(8) leads, 
under the circumstances of this case, to the forfeiture of protected liberty 
interests without appropriate due process. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that a state shall not 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., 
Amendment XIV. Determining whether a state action violates an individual's right of 
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procedural due process involves a two-part test: (1) whether the state deprived the individual of a 
liberty or property interest; and (2) if so, what process was due pursuant to the deprivation. 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 US 422, 428, 102 S.Ct 1148, 71 L.ED 2d 265 (1982); see 
also Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 US 702, 721, 117 S.Ct 2258, 138 L.Ed 2d 772 (1997) 
(noting that a particular right qualifies as a protected liberty interest if it is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition," and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed" (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
Relevant to this case, Pentico is invested with two protected liberty interests. Pentico has 
a fundamental liberty interest in petitioning his government for redress of grievances. See 
McDonald v. Smith, 427 US 479, 485, 105 S.Ct. 2787 (holding that the right to petition 
government officials "was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the 
freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble".) In addition, Pentico has a fundamental liberty 
interest in traveling upon and accessing public property that all other members of the public are 
free to travel upon and access. See Williams v. Fears, 179 US 270, 274, 21 S.Ct128, 45 L.Ed 
186 (1900) (holding that the "right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another 
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty"); see also Kent v. Dulles, 3 57 US 116, 
126, 78 S.Ct 1113, 2 L.Ed 2d 1204 (1958) ("freedom of movement across frontiers in either 
direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. It may be as close to the heart 
of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic 
in our scheme of values."). 
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Because of Pentico's liberty interest involved, the State may not interfere with those 
rights without affording him due process. Logan, 455 US at 428. Determining what process is 
sufficient to authorize such interference depends on weighing three factors: 
"(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would 
entail." 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319,321,332, 96 S.Ct 893, 47 L. Ed 2d 18 (1976). 
Under the Matthews test, application of LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) to Pentico violates his right 
to procedural due process. First, as explained above, the interests affected were fundamental 
liberty interests. Second, while it is apparent that Pentico was ordered to leave a traditional 
public forum for no adequate reason and that he was thereafter, if the statute applies, 
automatically precluded from returning for one year, LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) affords citizens in this 
position with absolutely no process to challenge an arbitrary exclusion or an excessively long bar 
against returning. Third, while the State may be forgiven for less than full procedural safeguards 
where it can show that the fiscal and administrative burdens of affording such safeguards would 
prove too great a burden, the problem here is that there are no procedural safeguards at all. 
Considering the gravity of the rights involved, the State cannot demonstrate that fiscal and 
administrative burdens justify failing to provide for even a nominal administrative hearing in 
front of a neutral decision-maker. Citizens who are about to lose the privilege to drive a car for 
at least 90 days because they were caught driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 are given 
administrative hearings and afforded a right to present evidence and to have a neutral hearing 
officer determine if a violation has occurred. See LC. § 18-8002(A). A citizen who is being 
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denied acknowledged and important First Amendment rights, for a full year is entitled to at least 
as much protection. 
Because, as it has been applied here, it is clear that one year exclusion provision of LC. § 
l 8-7008(A)(8) generates a significant deprivation of fundamental liberty interests without 
affording any procedure for assuring due process, it is unconstitutional. Consequently, a 
conviction for a violation of the one year exclusion provision is itself unconstitutional. 
b. Enforcement of the one year exclusion provision of J.C. §18-7008(8) leads, 
under the circumstances of this case to an unconstitutional prior restraint of 
protected first amendment rights. 
The one year exclusion provision of LC. § 18-7008(A)(8), if applicable in this case, 
would preclude Mr. Pentico from engaging in all activities that might be otherwise perfectly 
legal or protected activity at each of the identified properties for a period of one year. He could 
not be on the Capitol grounds to engage in a protest. He could not got to visit a legislator to 
speak about any grievance he might have. He could not go to the capitol to testify in support or 
opposition to a bill. He could not go to the Governor's office to seek an appointment to discuss 
a grievance, a concern, pending or proposed legislation or to even join in a show of support for 
the signing of legislation. He could not go to the Department of Education to seek information 
or to seek help with any matters over which the Department has administrative authority. All of 
these things are perfectly legal and permissible for other citizens and most clearly are 
constitutionally protected activity. But if the one year exclusion applies to Mr. Pentico, he would 
be precluded from these activities and this exclusion would, absent judicial prohibition, apply 
with absolutely no regard to the fact that the record contains not a shred of information to 
support any rational conclusion that the restraint upon his rights is based on something other than 
the content of his communications. 
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In State ex. rel. Kidwell v. US. lvfktg, 102 Idaho 451, 631 P .2d 622 (1981 ), the Idaho 
Supreme Court engaged in an evaluation of what constitutes an impermissible prior restraint. 
Here there is no question that the one year exclusion would restrain rights (speech and petition of 
government) without regard to the content of the restrained communication. But as the Court 
notes in State ex. rel. Kidwell this is not the end of the inquiry. The remaining question is the 
why. The restraint of the right to distribute printed material because a person was placed in 
prison for distributing illegal materials would not constitute an impermissible prior restraint but 
the restraint of the right to distribute printed materials because the content was not acceptable to 
those in power would be impermissible. State ex. rel. Kidwell, supra, 102 at 455-456, 631 P.2d 
626-627. The difference which the Court identified was in former instance the restriction was 
due solely to content and in the latter it was not. 
However, this case presents, at best, a blended situation. An automatic and conclusive 
one year exclusion would restraint Mr. Pentico by virtue of the application of a law but under the 
circumstances presented to the Court, it is not possible to tell whether the law was being applied 
against him because of his conduct or because of the content of what he was attempting to 
communicate. What is clear is that on the record before the Court it is not possible to determine 
that the restraint is based upon any basis that would constitute a permissible justification for 
cutting off substantial and protected rights. Fundamental concepts of due process mandate that 
the burden for demonstrating a basis to warrant the forfeiture of rights should rest upon the 
Government. In instances in which forfeiture is asserted as a justification for taking away a 
right, the burden of proof is on the entity seeking to suspend the right. See, eg. Sagewillow, Inc 
v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 843, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003). Here the 
record is devoid of information which would support a determination that Mr. Pentico should be 
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treated as having forfeited for a full year with respect to the locations at issue, the entire package 
of rights afforded to him by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by 
i\rticle I, Sections 9 & 10 of the Idaho Constitution. 
This being the case, application of an automatic and conclusive one year exclusion is, 
based on the record before the Trial Court, unconstitutional and Mr. Pentico' s conviction for 
violating that exclusion is a violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Idaho. 
3. Mr. Pentico Was Denied The Effective Assistance Of Trial Counsel At The Trial 
Court Level In Violation Of His Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance 
Of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). The Idaho Constitution also 
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. To present a triable ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Pentico needs only 
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to demonstrate that this record, if taken as true, is sufficient to support an objective review of the 
competency of the conduct of Trial Counsel and that the deficient performance prejudiced Mr. 
Pentico. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as applied by State v. Yakovac, 145 
Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008). The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a 
reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney 
had acted properly. Strickland at 689. Courts will not attempt to second guess Trial Counsel's 
strategic decisions unless those decisions are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Murphy v. 
State, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at 747. 
The United States Supreme Court has said that the duty of the defense lawyer "is to make 
the adversarial testing process work in the particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Thus, it is defense counsel's specific performance in Mr. Pentico's 
case which matters, not his body of work over a career or his reputation. The purpose of the 
effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to castigate the lack of diligence or 
talent of the mediocre lawyers or to lionize the career accomplishments of the best lawyers. 
"The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 6809. 
The circumstances of this case present obvious, substantial and potentially constitutional 
challenges to a prosecution of Mr. Pentico for a violation of LC. § 18-7008(A)(8). Because those 
challenges were not made; no record of the available evidence was created. Because there was 
no record, Mr. Pentico could not get the issues addressed on Appeal. Because the issues were 
not raised in the Trial Court or preserved for Appeal, Mr. Pentico has never had the benefit of 
asserting the challenges and protecting his rights. 
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This series of events was set in motion because, Trial Counsel, as he admits, did not 
recognize those challenges and was focused entirely on a challenge arising from the claim that 
Mr. Pentico's trip to the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, was itself constitutionally protected 
activity. Trial Counsel may well have been knocked off the track by the State's multiple 
attempts to find a law under which it could prosecute Mr. Pentico, but that does not change the 
fact that Trial Counsel only represented Mr. Pentico with respect to one of the elements of the 
charge upon which he was tried and consequently failed to raise and preserve the critical 
constitutionally based defenses pertaining to the other elements. 
Trial Counsel's failure to present substantial and material defenses was not a byproduct 
of a strategic decision. Indeed, it could not be the byproduct of a strategic decision because by 
definition, a strategic decision involves recognition of the options and a conscious election to set 
one or more of the options aside. Trial Counsel having not recognized the options 19 could not 
make a conscious election to set one or more of them aside. The Court of Appeals, suggested 
that Trial Counsel's conduct as the consequences of a strategic choice but this unrebutted records 
invalidates this hypothesis. Trial Counsel did not appreciate the importance of challenging the 
predicate event, the Ask to Leave, on factual, legal and constitutional grounds; consequently, he 
did not even contemplate the possible confusion that might be generated by a Rule 404(b) 
Motion and having not contemplated it, he did not take steps to challenge a misapplication of the 
rule, if one was in fact occurring, to excluded the evidence invalidating the predicate event.20 
Similarly Trial Counsel did not take steps, by offer of proof, to protect the record if he was 
19 Aff. Derr, ,r 6, R. 80-81. 
20 Aff. Derr, ,r 6, R. 80-81, Aff. Bistline, ,r 9(b), R. 87-88. 
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incorrectly barred from presenting evidence about constitutionally protected conduct which 
invalidated the Ask to Leave. 
Mr. Pentico has, through affidavits and court records placed into the record of this action, 
presented evidence, which if taken and true, is more than sufficient to, upon objective review, to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the representation provided was 
constitutionally deficient. To this point the courts below have made any attempt to explain how 
the omissions are excusable or defend them as lying with the boundaries of reasonable 
professional performance. The records demonstrates that, for whatever reason, a normally 
competent lawyer failed to recognize all of the elements which must be proven by the State to 
support the conviction and as a consequence failed to bring the force of his skills to bare upon 
the weakest link in the criminal charge that was ultimately brought against his client. On this 
record, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Pentico has failed to demonstrate a triable claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
4. Mr. Pentico Is Not Foreclosed By The Circumstances From Relief On Both His 
Constitutionally Based Challenges To The Statute As Applied To Him And His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim. 
The Trial Court and the District Court erroneously determined that Mr. Pentico was 
foreclosed from raising the substantive due process and procedural due proceeding arguments set 
out above because either these arguments were raised in the criminal proceeding, could have 
been raised in the criminal proceeding. This record establishes beyond debate that the due 
process arguments challenging the lawfulness of the statute as applied to Mr. Pentico were not 
contemplated by Trial Counsel and they were not raised at trial. Mr. Pentico concedes that his 
Appellate Counsel in the criminal proceeding made every effort to raise these arguments upon 
appeal - consistent with the apparent requirements of LC. § 19-4901(b) that the effort be made 
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to raise the issues in the criminal proceeding to avoid forfeiture of the right to assert them. But 
the Court of Appeals did not address these arguments. It ruled, with respect to the substantive 
due process argument that the record was inadequate to permit a determination of the issue and 
that it might have been waived by a strategic decision of Trial Counsel. The Court of Appeals 
showed no sign that it even recognized the procedural due process arguments had been made. It 
may have intended to include them among the issues which it concluded had not been preserved 
for and could not be raised on appeal but it certainly did not consider these issues on the merits. 
Mr. Pentico is not before this Court seeking to use post-conviction procedures as a 
substitute for what was resolved in the criminal proceedings. The issues he presents in this 
action were not raised as any part of the constitutional challeng raised by Mr. Derr in the 
criminal trial. These issues have never been decided by any of the Courts that have been 
involved in this action. Mr. Pentico is merely trying to obtain a resolution of these issues which, 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel, he could not get resolved in the criminal proceeding. At 
its heart the post-conviction procedure is the last process afforded by the State to ensure that the 
defendants in criminal proceedings are afforded fundamental due process. Here, Mr. Pentico is 
seeking the benefit of constitutional protections which his criminal case Trial Counsel failed to 
appreciate and to raise and which, due to this failure were not considered on the appeal in the 
criminal trial. Either it is appropriate for these arguments to be addressed in this proceeding 
because they bear upon the constitutionality of the convictions and could not have been raised 
upon direct appeal or alternatively to determine that due to ineffective assistance of counsel the 
arguments, though substantial were waived in the criminal proceeding. In the first instances 
the remedy is to set aside the conviction and direct that the constitutional issues be faced head on 
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and in the second instance the remedy is to set aside the conviction and to direct that the action 
be set for a new trial. 
Mr. Pentico is not seeking a substitute for due process he has already had. He is seeking 
constitutionally assured due process that he has thus far been denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse the 
Order Granting Summary Dismissal and remand the matter to the Trial Court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this Courts determination of the issues raised herein. 
DATED this 28th day of November 2014. 
HEIDIJO~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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